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Abstract—Estimates of airline delay costs as a function of 
delay magnitude are combined with fuel and (future) emissions 
charges to make cost-benefit trade-offs in the pre-departure and 
airborne phases. Hypothetical scenarios for the distribution of 
flow management slots are explored in terms of their cost and 
target-setting implications. The general superiority of passenger-
centric metrics is of significance for delay measurement, 
although flight delays are still the only commonly-reported type 
of metric in both the US and Europe. There is a particular need 
for further research into reactionary (network) effects, especially 
with regard to passenger metrics and flow management delay. 
 
Index Terms—cost of delay, disruption management, 
emissions, flow management, passenger. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and scope 
 In this paper we present estimates for the cost of delay to 
airlines, and show how these costs can be combined with fuel 
and (future) emissions charges to make cost-benefit trade-offs 
both in the pre-departure and airborne phases of delay cost 
management. We also examine some hypothetical scenarios 
for the distribution of Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) 
slots, exploring these in terms of their cost and target-setting 
implications. 
 The cost of delay to airline operations comprises several 
components. These include the costs of passenger delay to the 
airline, plus crew and maintenance costs. Also, primarily in 
the airborne phase, fuel costs need to considered, and, in the 
future, emissions charges. The total cost is often dominated by 
the passenger component. This component may be split into 
‘hard’ costs, such as those due to passenger rebooking, 
compensation and care, and ‘soft’ costs. Hard costs are 
typically difficult to fully ascribe to a given flight due to 
accounting complications, but are, in theory at least, 
identifiable deficits in the airline’s bottom line. Soft costs 
manifest themselves in several ways. Even with no experience 
of an airline, a passenger may perceive it to be unpunctual and 
choose another, instead. Due to a delay on one occasion, a 
passenger may defect from an unpunctual airline as a result of 
dissatisfaction (and maybe later come back). A passenger with 
a flexible ticket may arrive at an airport and decide to take a 
competitor’s on-time flight instead of a delayed flight, on 
which they were originally booked. Soft costs, exemplified by 
these types of revenue loss, are rather more difficult to 
quantify, but may even dominate the hard costs (Cramer and 
Irrgang (2007), Cook et al. (2004)). We summarise here our 
previous derivations of each of these cost 
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components, 
focusing in particular on their distribution as a function of 
delay duration. For passenger delay, longer delays have higher 
associated costs per minute: hard costs are higher as airlines 
pay more in recovery and care costs, such as meal vouchers 
and overnight accommodation. The soft costs are also higher 
for longer delays, as passengers are more likely to be 
dissatisfied as the result of a longer delay than a shorter one. 
Although our models specify delay costs for each minute up to 
300 minutes, and these explicit values are used in all 
calculations, selected mid-range values only are shown in 
tables, where applicable, to save space. 
B. Delay management context 
Airlines have windows of opportunity for mitigating 
against, and managing, delay costs, as illustrated in Table 1A 
and Table 1B. 
 
TABLE 1A 
DELAY COST MANAGEMENT BY PHASE OF FLIGHT (DESCRIPTIONS) 
Phase Description 
 Strategic Resources committed at planning stage: advance delay contingencies 
Pre-
departure 
Slot management process. 
(Also decision point for fuel uplift.) 










Aircraft, crew and passenger  
delay recovery 
  
 Disruption management is a vital component of airline 
operations1. It may focus on the ground-based recovery of 
operations, which have become misaligned from the strategic 
plan, and rarely extends to a properly costed recovery in the 
airborne phase. A major challenge facing the industry is the 
integration of disruption management techniques (and the 
supporting tools that are commercially available) into a 
centralised optimisation process, bringing together the various 
cost centres of an airline. 
 In particular, passenger services and reaccommodation 
(booking disrupted passengers onto new flights) are rarely 
integrated with flight operations. Kohl et al. (2007) comment 
that: “Successful operation of an airline depends on 
coordinated actions of all supporting functions.  
 
1 Substantial reviews of the literature are furnished by Bratu and 
Barnhart (2006) and by Kohl et al. (2007). 
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 However, each group typically operates under its own 
directive, with its own budget and performance measures ... 
Generally, in the disruption management literature passengers 
are given a low priority”. 
 
TABLE 1B 
DELAY COST MANAGEMENT BY PHASE OF FLIGHT (EXAMPLES) 
Phase Example 
 Strategic 
Schedule buffers to absorb tactical 
delays, without over-compromising 
utilisation of aircraft/crew 
Pre-
departure 
Re-route: accepting/filing a longer route to 
bring a departure slot forward 
Airborne Change of cost index
2; request to ATC for 










Re-booking delayed passengers. 
(Potential of associated ‘soft’ costs.) 
 
Narasimhan (2001) also offers a succinct summary of the 
challenge: “In most airlines … applications are not deeply 
integrated. This implies that two groups doing their individual 
best could actually be working against each other.” 
Although customer service coordinators are consulted, as 
Bratu and Barnhart (2006) comment, passenger disruptions 
rarely drive operational decision making. Aircraft and crew 
are often recovered first, with a need to respect aircraft 
maintenance requirements – especially for ‘maintenance 
critical’ aircraft (i.e. which will be grounded if not attended 
to). If a disruption management solution cannot be generated 
within a matter of minutes, it may become redundant, which 
still poses a serious problem for many optimisers.  
C. Overview of approach 
Costs have been calculated for each major cost of delay 
component. In each case, these are presented for each of 
twelve supported aircraft types, representing a range of 
equipment operated in Europe. The fundamental principle 
involved in calculating the maintenance and crew costs is to 
derive marginal, time-based costs from unit costs, by 
removing fixed costs and correctly apportioning cycles-based 
costs across marginal delay minutes. Whilst many delay costs 
differ by phase of flight, passenger costs are a notable 
exception, since these are only a function of arrival delay. 
Costs are presented according to three cost scenarios: low, 
base and high. Scenario assumptions are consistent across all 
the cost models presented, for example with appropriate seat 
assumptions for different airline business models (e.g. aircraft 
class configurations) driving both the crew and passenger cost 
estimates. 
 
2 The cost index is a parameter set in the cockpit, which 
determines how the flight management system will control the 
aircraft. It quantifies the choice to fly faster to recover delay, or to fly 
slower to conserve fuel. 
II. DELAYED PASSENGER COSTS 
A. Estimating hard and soft aggregate costs 
In previous papers we have detailed the calculation of 
passenger hard costs of delay to the airline (Cook et al., 2009) 
and the corresponding soft costs (Cook et al., 2009a). Base 
cost scenarios were derived from independently concurring 
sources (two European airlines) on total passenger costs for a 
2003 reference base. Since then, however, a significant 
change has been brought about to both types of cost, by the 
European Union’s air passenger compensation and assistance 
scheme (Regulation (EC) No 261/2004), introduced on 17 
February 2005. It affords passengers with additional rights in 
cases of flight disruption (denied boarding, cancellation and 
delay) and only relates to departure delay; nothing is due to 
the passenger for any type of arrival delay or missed 
connection per se. It applies to any flight departing from the 
EU and to all flights operated by EU carriers from or to an EU 
airport.  
In the context of disruption management, Kohl et al. (2007) 
do not quote specific delay costs, and Bratu and Barnhart 
(2006) use values of time to estimate passenger costs. 
Jovanović (2008) appears to be the only publication to date, 
specifically estimating the cost impact of Regulation 261, 
citing a comprehensive response from a major European, full-
service, network carrier, and more limited data from another, 
similar carrier. 
The resulting aggregate cost estimations are summarised in 
Table 2. Two airline sources have been used to rationalise the 
equal (base scenario) split between hard and soft costs. The 
values set for the high and low cost estimates are more a 
matter of informed judgement, in particular subject to further 
research, but nonetheless based on semi-quantitative 
arguments. Soft costs, it is argued, are relatively less 
impacting for carriers with a low cost base, such that the ratio 
between the high and low scenarios is 4.0, although these are 
much closer for base and high scenarios. This asymmetry is 
intentional and reflects soft costs saturating out at higher total 
costs. 
Overall, the total base cost scenario for 2008 is 20% higher 
than the 2003 value previously reported. Inflation and the 
impact of Regulation 261 have been cited as incrementing 
factors, whilst increasingly cost-driven markets have been 
cited as a capping effect through soft costs. 
TABLE 2 
THREE COST SCENARIOS FOR PASSENGER HARD AND SOFT COSTS 
Cost type Low Base High 
Hard cost 0.11 0.18 0.22 
Soft cost 0.05 0.18 0.20 
Total 0.16 0.36 0.42 
Costs are in Euros (2008) per average passenger,  
per average delay minute, per average delayed flight 
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B. Distributing the costs as a function of delay duration 
Having derived the aggregate hard and soft passenger costs, 
it is now necessary to distribute these as a function of duration 
of delay: longer delays will tend to have higher per-minute 
costs than shorter ones. 
Using large data sets for passenger booking and flight 
operations from a major US airline, Bratu and Barnhart (2004) 
show how passenger-centric metrics are superior to flight-
based metrics for assessing passenger delays, primarily 
because the latter do not take account of replanned itineraries 
of passengers disrupted due to flight-leg cancellations and 
missed connections. These authors conclude that flight-leg 
delays severely underestimate passenger delays for hub-and-
spoke airlines, demonstrating that the average passenger delay 
is 1.7 times greater than the average flight-leg delay, with 
average disrupted passenger delay growing exponentially with 
load factors. Sherry et al. (2008) concur that “flight delay data 
is a poor proxy for measuring passenger trip delays”. Based 
on a model using 2005 US data, they conclude that the 
average passenger trip delay is 34 minutes longer than the 
average flight delay (53 minutes). This suggests a factor of 
just over 1.6.  
In order to distribute the hard costs as a function of delay 
duration, we combined an empirical (airline) source of ‘care’ 
costs (meal vouchers, hotel accommodation, tax-free 
vouchers, frequent-flyer programme miles and phonecards) 
with a theoretical distribution of ‘reaccommodation’ costs 
(rerouting/rebooking passengers, ticket reimbursements and 
compensation). Specifically-fitted, passenger-centric 
corrective weighting factors for the hard costs were used, with 
attention paid that neither care nor reaccommodation costs 
















Fig. 1. Modelled distribution of (total) hard costs, for three scenarios. 
 
For distributing the soft costs of delay, a logit function was 
used to express the propensity, ‘Π’, of a passenger switching 
from a given airline, to some other choice, after trips with 
given delay experiences (black curve, Fig. 2). Quantification 
of the saturation of delay inconvenience (primary survey, grey 
curve) and crossovers in Kano satisfaction factors3 (primary 
analysis based on literature data; dashed vertical lines show 
boundary of intolerance) contributed towards the model. 
Relationships between market share, punctuality and customer 




Fig. 2. Hypothesised switching propensity by delay duration 
 
C. Per-aircraft passenger costs of delay 
Table 3 shows some of the passenger cost of delay values 
translated into per-aircraft costs for each of the twelve 
supported aircraft types. Drawing on typical seat allocations, 
using ICAO 2006 fleet data with a sample of over 4000 
aircraft, load factors of 60%, 75% and 90% were applied to 
the low, base and high cost scenarios, respectively, for 
narrowbodies (short haul). For widebodies (long haul), the 
load factor applied was 80%. In Table 3, mid-range values 
only are shown and only for the first three of the delay ranges 




PER-AIRCRAFT PASSENGER COSTS OF DELAY BY DELAY RANGE  
(BASE CASE SCENARIO) 
Range: 1-15 mins 16-30 mins 31-45 mins 
B737-300 12 35 60 
B737-400 14 40 68 
B737-500 11 31 53 
B737-800 16 44 76 
B757-200 19 55 94 
B767-300ER 29 81 140 
B747-400 41 117 202 
A319 13 36 62 
A320 15 42 72 
A321 18 51 88 
ATR42-300 4 12 20 
ATR72-200 6 16 28 
All costs are in Euros per minute 
 
3 Kano et al. (1984) defines a multi-tier approach to customer 
satisfaction, using “must-be”, “one-dimensional” and “attractive” 
requirements. 
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III. MARGINAL CREW COSTS 
A. Overview 
The calculation of the marginal flight and cabin crew costs 
derives the cost of crewing for additional minutes over and 
above those planned at the strategic phase. The costs were 
derived from a detailed examination of payment mechanisms 
for aircraft crew, with reference to salary ranges in 2008 and a 
review of flight and cabin crew payment mechanisms for a 
wide range of airlines. In Europe, airlines typically pay crew 
fixed salaries (supplemented by flying time payments) 
whereas crew in North America are typically remunerated by 
a ‘pay-and-credit’ scheme whereby duty and flying time 
determine the salary (Nissen and Haase, 2006). 
From a European perspective (the basis of these estimates), 
for marginal crew costs incurred by airlines during delay, even 
delays in excess of an hour could result in no additional costs. 
For example, an at-gate delay would have no effect on the cost 
of crew paid by block-hours worked as this payment 
mechanism is triggered off-blocks. An airborne delay will 
have no effect on the cost of crew paid by sectors flown as this 
payment mechanism is cycles-based. In both cases, a large 
proportion of pay would normally be fixed as basic salary, 
with per diem allowances. For this research, proxy rates were 
calculated for the base case, whilst delay minutes were set at 
overtime rates for the high cost scenario. 
B. Summary of methodology and results 
Typical pilot and flight attendant salaries were calculated 
for various European airlines, using their corresponding 
payment schemes with realistic annual block/flight duty hours, 
sectors flown and overnight stopovers. Pilots’ salaries increase 
by size of aircraft, although commonality can be seen within 
aircraft families (e.g. the A320 family). In contrast, flight 
attendants’ salaries are more consistent across all aircraft 
types. 
In Europe and the US, total cabin crew numbers are driven 
by the maximum number of seats available. A typical range of 
seats per aircraft was established using ICAO 2006 fleet data 
(as per the passenger cost calculation). Unusual aircraft seat 
configurations were excluded from this range. 
These calculations relate to delay costs incurred by the 
airline, so on-costs need to be included. These cover a range 
of additional crew-related costs to the airline, such as 
administration and personnel costs associated with managing 
crew, company contributions to crew pension schemes and 
social security/insurance contributions. For a comparison of 
on-costs for a range of European airlines, see Doganis (2005). 
The lowest proportion of additional cost was found to be 17-
18%, with the highest proportion being an extra 52%. 
Removing extreme values, the on-cost low to high scenario 
range was rounded to 20-40%, with the mid-point (30%) 
adopted for the base cost scenario. 
Zero-cost is assigned to the overall, low cost scenario. 
However, it cannot be assumed that at-gate and airborne hours 
do not generate additional costs to the airline for the base and 
high cost scenarios. Although a delay experienced by an 
individual flight may have no immediate effect on the amount 
paid by the airline to the delayed crew, over a period of time 
(initially 28 consecutive days, then the calendar year), delays 
are likely to affect crews’ remaining flight and duty hours – 
limited by Regulation (EC) 1899/2006. Either overtime 
payments will be paid earlier than would have been the case 
without such delays (when the hours worked or duty threshold 
is reached) and/or out-of-hours crew will need to be covered 
by other/reserve crew. Proxy rates are thus modelled, based on 
derived ‘time-based’ salaries for flight and cabin crew, for 
each aircraft type. The final results are shown in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4 
MARGINAL CREW COSTS PER AIRCRAFT, AT-GATE OR AIRBORNE 
Aircraft Low Base High 
B737-300 0 8.1 16.9 
B737-400 0 7.8 17.0 
B737-500 0 7.6 16.5 
B737-800 0 8.6 18.6 
B757-200 0 8.6 17.2 
B767-300ER 0 12.2 33.0 
B747-400 0 15.9 43.0 
A319 0 7.0 14.5 
A320 0 7.4 15.4 
A321 0 7.4 15.4 
ATR42-300 0 5.4 11.0 
ATR72-200 0 5.8 12.4 
All costs are in Euros per marginal minute. On-costs are included. 
 
The base scenario costs, being proxy rates, are not the rates 
at which crew would actually be paid, but instead allow the 
determination of an equivalent marginal (block-) hour crew 
cost to the airline, based on realistic operational assumptions. 
They are averaged back over the whole year, allowing typical 
delay costs to be proportionately spread over crew paid at 
basic and overtime rates. For the high cost scenario, it is 
assumed that delay minutes are paid simply at overtime rates. 
 
IV. MARGINAL MAINTENANCE COSTS 
A. Overview 
The marginal maintenance costs incurred by delayed 
aircraft relate to factors such as the mechanical attrition of 
aircraft waiting at gates, subjected to arrival management, or 
accepting longer re-routes in order to obtain a better departure 
slot. The basic principle is to derive marginal, time-based 
costs from unit costs, by removing fixed costs and correctly 
apportioning cycles-based costs across marginal delay 
minutes. Large proportions of maintenance costs are fixed, in 
terms of overheads, or on a per-cycle basis.  
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The former is dealt with by separately identifying aircraft-
specific overheads (ESG Aviation Services, 2007) and 
removing them from the cost model. The latter is dealt with by 
the development of a gate-to-gate ‘workload model’. 
It was first necessary to develop a pre-cursor model for 
computing unit maintenance costs. 2006 block-hour (unit) 
costs were derived from earlier (in-house) 2002 data, using 
ICAO (2006) Airline Monitor (ESG Aviation Services, 2007) 
data. These unit costs were then updated from 2006 to 2008 
values (using maintenance-specific inflationary factors) before 
finally translating these unit costs into the appropriate 
marginal at-gate and cruise costs for 2008 through the gate-to-
gate model. 
B. Summary of methodology and results 
For modern aircraft types, ‘letter check’ distinctions are less 
important, since maintenance tasks are grouped into packages 
in a way that is more efficient for the operator, i.e. matching 
work against operational requirement. Nevertheless, the 
industry generally still refers to maintenance checks such as 
‘A’, ‘C’ etc. Table 5 shows typical maintenance check 
intervals for ‘A’ and ‘C’ checks, whereby the newer ‘phase’ 
intervals have been converted to letter check intervals.  
 
TABLE 5  
TYPICAL MAINTENANCE CHECK INTERVALS 
Aircraft ‘A’ Check ‘C’ Check 
B737-300 275 FH 18 months 
B737-400 275 FH 18 months 
B737-500 275 FH 18 months 
B737-800 500 FH 4000-6000 FH 
B757-200 500-600 FH 18 months / 6000 FH / 3000 FC 
B767-300ER 600 FH 18 months / 6000 FH 
B747-400 600 FH 18 months / 7500 FH 
A319 600 FH 18-20 months / 6000 FH / 3000 FC 
A320 600 FH 18-20 months / 6000 FH / 3000 FC 
A321 600 FH 18-20 months / 6000 FH / 3000 FC 
ATR42-300 300-500 FH 3000-4000 FH 
ATR72-200 300-500 FH 3000-4000 FH 
Key: FC, flight cycles; FH, flight (not block) hours. 
 
Modelling the 2006 unit costs (the most recent full year of 
airline financial returns, at the time of calculation) from 2002 
data was non-trivial. During this period, the cost of 
maintenance changed in highly variable ways across airlines. 
Some rose sharply, whilst others had periods of very large 
falls. Not all of these changes can be explained by changes in 
the age or composition of aircraft fleets, airline takeovers or 
maintenance centralisation within airline groups. Due to the 
lack of clear overall trends, best-fit solutions were obtained by 
solving a series of simultaneous equations to estimate average 
narrowbody and widebody maintenance costs per block-hour, 
with some outlier smoothing (but still taking account of likely 
upper and lower bounds for the high and low cost scenarios).  
These unit, block-hour costs for 2008 (encompassing all 
maintenance costs, but with overheads subtracted) were then 
processed through the workload model into marginal at-gate 
and cruise costs. Per-cycle costs incurred during the highest 
intensity phases of flight (i.e. from take-off roll to top of 
climb, and from top of descent to landing roll) were frozen out 
of the calculations. In these specific phases, although a high 
share of the total wear and tear is experienced, no delays were 
assumed. Separate airborne phases were allocated for cruise 
and arrival management, although these produced very similar 
results (as expected). Fuel burn rates were used as a proxy for 
workload to apportion the powerplant costs across the phases. 
 
TABLE 6 











B737-300 740 0.5  3.8
B737-400 760 0.5 3.9
B737-500 620 0.4 3.2
B737-800 540 0.4 2.8
B757-200 900 0.6 4.6
B767-300ER 970 0.6 4.6
B747-400 1 500 1.0 7.1
A319 630 0.4 3.3
A320 620 0.4 3.2
A321 720 0.5 3.7
ATR42-300 370 0.2 1.9
ATR72-200 460 0.3 2.4
All costs are in Euros. Marginal costs exclude overheads. 
 
Notably, the resulting marginal cruise minute costs (Table 
6) are similar to literature-sourced values for combined ‘A’ 
plus ‘C’ checks converted to block-minute costs. The 
implication for airlines is that using ‘A’ plus ‘C’ check 
estimates for marginal minute costings probably gives 
reasonable estimates of the true marginal cost of maintenance. 
The ideal development of this methodology would be to 
extend it to tail-specific cost tracking. Power-by-the-hour or 
cost-per-flying-hour maintenance agreements now account for 
many airline maintenance contracts. Careful analysis of the 
contract terms, with corrections for fixed (e.g. overhead) 
costs, is necessary to convert these costs into true marginal 
minute costs. 
 
V. NETWORK EFFECTS – AN OVERVIEW 
The costs discussed in the previous sections need to be 
scaled up to the network level, since original delays caused by 
one aircraft (‘primary’ delays) cause ‘knock-on’ effects in the 
rest of the network (known as ‘secondary’ or ‘reactionary’ 
delays). These need to be factored in to any comprehensive 
assessment of delay costs. An overview of this is given in this 
section, with the discussion developed further in Section VIII. 
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Reactionary delays are generally worse for longer primary 
delays and for primary delays that occur earlier in the 
operational day (when the knock-on effects in the network are 
greater). They also depend on the airlines’ ability to recover 
from the delay, for example due to the extent of schedule 
padding (buffering). Primary delays not only affect the 
initially delayed (‘causal’) airframe on subsequent legs 
(rotational reactionary effect), but also other aircraft (non-
rotational reactionary effect). 
The 2008 European reactionary to primary delay ratio of 
approximately 0.8 (EUROCONTROL (2009), see also Section 
VIII) means that for each minute of primary delay, on 
average, another 0.8 minutes of reactionary delay are 
generated in the network. This is often expressed in the 
literature as a multiplier, 1.8. 
Rather than multiplying all delay costs by a common factor 
(e.g. 1.8) in order to get a value corresponding to the total 
network cost (primary plus reactionary cost), Beatty et al. 
(1998) studied delay propagation using American Airlines’ 
schedule data, building delay trees with schedule buffers 
included in the delay-tree scenarios. Based in part on this 
model, the multipliers we have developed quantitatively 
differentiate between rotational and non-rotational reactionary 
delays and also take into account the magnitude of the primary 
delay, thus producing multipliers for each delay range in 
Table 7 (selected mid-range values only shown). In our 
models, all reactionary delay is treated as at-gate delay, and 
non-rotational reactionary delay is based on European 
‘average’ aircraft, as described in Section VII. 
The use of these reactionary multipliers is not restricted to 
passenger delay costs, but also applies to marginal delay costs 
such as those associated with crew and maintenance. Separate 
methods are used for applying the different types of 
reactionary multipliers to passenger, long-haul crew, short-
haul crew and marginal maintenance costs. 
 
TABLE 7 

















Basic 1.48 1.74 2.00 2.25 2.51 2.77 .. 6.47 
Rotat.a 0.36 0.56 0.75 0.94 1.13 1.32 .. 4.11 
Non-r.a 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.44 .. 1.37 
a Rotat. = Additional rotational; Non-r. =Additional non-rotational. 
VI. PRE-DEPARTURE AND AIRBORNE DELAY MANAGEMENT 
In this section we show how the costs calculated in the 
previous sections can be combined with fuel and (future) 
emissions charges to make cost-benefit trade-offs both in the 
pre-departure and airborne phases of delay cost management. 
Fuel burn cost calculations were undertaken (in 2008) using 
the flight planning application Lido OC (Lufthansa Systems 
Aeronautics), based on operational flight plans. In addition to 
these direct fuel costs, the future costs of emissions charges 
were considered. CO2 from aviation is scheduled for inclusion 
in the EU emissions trading scheme from 01 January 2012. In 
its current form, the legislation requires all airlines operating 
to or from EU airports to surrender permits for the CO2 
emitted. For the airlines, this will result in all fuel use being 
associated with an additional carbon permit cost. The 
European Commission has also committed to developing a 
flanking policy to address NOx emissions from aviation by 
November 2009.  
Emissions are estimated using the product of the fuel 
consumed and the emission index (emission per unit mass of 
fuel). For CO2, the emission index is a function only of the 
fuel and can be considered constant across an aircraft fleet. 
Fuel consumption above 3000 ft was used for the NOx 
calculations; below this level NOx emissions are important for 
air quality considerations but not for climate impact. Estimates 
of NOx emissions took into account aircraft type and route 
length. For illustration only4, costs were sourced from 
ENVISA (2006), which assigns the climate impacts of CO2 
emissions at € 37 / tonne and those of NOx at € 6414 / tonne, 
for a base case scenario. 
Fig. 3 shows how these calculations may be used to 
compare at-gate costs with cruise extension costs for a given 
delay duration, aircraft and cost scenario5. In this case, the at-
gate (auxiliary power unit and engines off) cost is € 1109, 
whilst the cruise extension cost is € 1948. The latter is higher 












Fig. 3. B738 at-gate (left) and cruise extension (right) costs (20 minutes) 
 
The key application of comparisons such as these is for pre-
departure operations, e.g. trading the costs of bringing a 
delayed take-off slot x minutes forward against a re-route that 
is y minutes longer6, and for informing the process of airspace 
design. 
In decision-support for airborne delay recovery, it is 
necessary to trade accelerated fuel burn costs (and, from 2012, 
emissions charges) against these costs of delay.  
 
4 Emissions costs can only be an estimate at this time, as the price 
will depend on the design and implementation of emissions policy. 
5 Base cost scenarios are shown, including the reactionary delay 
effects outlined in Section V; cost of fuel (2008): € 0.7 / kg. 
6 In Fig. 3, x = y = 20 minutes, as a simple comparison. See Cook 
et al. (2004) for proper worked examples. 
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Since many airlines have significant barriers to quantifying 
such delay costs, they may use simple ‘rules of thumb’ to set 
the value of the cost index (see Table 1B). Of the (non-
fuel/emissions) components of delay cost (i.e. passenger 
delay, crew and maintenance costs), it is clear from Fig. 3 that 
the passenger cost dominates (this is very often the case, 
except for the smallest delays). 
Fig. 4 shows a quantitative example of such a cost trade-off 
for a B738, which has incurred 22 minutes of delay on a flight 
from Lisbon to Helsinki. The dashed vertical line (right) 
represents the maximum number of minutes (19) that may be 
recovered by employing the cost index at its upper operational 
setting. The net benefit plotted is the difference between [(cost 
of delay) – (cost of fuel + emissions)], before and after the 
delay recovery applied (x-axis). Each curve represents 
different cost assumptions (from top to bottom: without 
emissions charges, fuel at € 0.5 / kg; without emissions 
charges, fuel at € 0.7 / kg; with emissions charges, fuel at 
€ 0.7 / kg). The optimised number of recovered minutes is 12, 
11 and 10 for the respective cost assumptions. The plot 
illustrates, for example, that when fuel is cheaper, it is optimal 
to recover more time and that recovering the full 19 minutes 
when fuel is more expensive and emissions charges apply, 
actually generates a net loss. For the latter assumption, 
recovering 19 minutes instead of the optimal 10 minutes, for 
twenty such B738 flights a day, would cause an estimated, 
relative annual loss of approximately € 6.7 million. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Net benefit of airborne recovered minutes for a B738 
VII. FLOW MANAGEMENT – COSTS AND TARGETS 
In this section we make a fairly crude estimation of the 
primary cost of the 2008 distribution of ATFM (delay) slots, 
drawing on the results of sections II-IV. By ‘delay’ slot, we 
are referring to ATFM slots issued for aircraft departures later 
than the time requested by the airline. We compare these costs 
with hypothetical scenarios under different distributions of 
ATFM delay, as an initial exploration of the implications for 
ATFM target-setting. 
Fig. 5 shows the distribution of ATFM delay minutes in 
2008 (data courtesy of Performance Review Unit, 
EUROCONTROL). The data refer to Instrument Flight Rules 
flights and, for ease of exposition, only those flights with 
ATFM delay are plotted, although 88% had no ATFM delay: 
these ‘zero-delay’ flights are, however, included in all the 
analyses which follow. Of course, many of these flights will 
have incurred compound delays, whereby only part of the total 















Fig. 5. ATFM delay distribution (2008, actual). 
 
Including the ‘zero-delay’ flights, the 2008 (‘actual’) 
distribution has a mean delay of µ=2.4 minutes, and, making a 
simplifying assumption for the mid-point of the highest-delay 
column, a standard deviation of σ=8.5. (Excluding the zero-
delay flights, the average of delay slots issued is around 20 
minutes.) 
It is possible to estimate the total primary cost of delay by 
taking the mid-point of each range and multiplying this by the 
cost per minute for passenger hard and soft costs, plus the 
crew and maintenance costs derived above, using a 2008 
‘average’ aircraft. This ‘average’ approximation was carried 
out by weighting the costs for the 12 supported aircraft by 
their relative flight frequencies in 2008 (data, not shown, 
courtesy of EUROCONTROL Statistics and Forecast Services 
– STATFOR). Since these costs of delay are dominated by 
passenger costs, the average aircraft used could, if desired, be 
quite closely approximated by either an A320 or a B738, 
which were also the two most common aircraft in Europe in 
2008 in terms of number of flights or total flight-hour 
duration. Load factors were as per Section II(c). 
The total cost estimate using this method is €1.7bn. 
Although the validity of the comparison is significantly 
limited, it is of some passing noteworthiness that 
EUROCONTROL (2009) estimates the total cost of ATFM 
delays in 2008 to be €1.5bn. This is quoted in 2007-Euro 
prices, currently uses a common value of €79 per minute for 
delays of above 15 minutes, and approximates costs to be 
close to zero for the first 15 minutes.  
Both these estimates (€1.7bn; €1.5bn) are derived from a 
number of common principles, and refer to at-gate delay 
without engines running. However, whilst the €1.7bn estimate 
is in 2008-Euro prices and estimates separate costs for each 
delay range, it notably excludes reactionary costs, unlike the 
EUROCONTROL value. Instead of dwelling on the 
comparison of these estimates, we turn our attention to the 
relative costs under different scenarios, using the mid-range 
method described. 
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Fig. 6 shows the trivial distribution, scenario 1, obtained by 
removing half of the flights in each delay category and 
moving them into the zero-delay category (not plotted). The 















Fig. 6. Scenario 1 – delay frequencies halved. 
 
For each scenario the data are summarised in Table 8; the 
total number of flights and the proportion of (remaining) 
plotted columns is always the same as for the 2008 (actual) 
distribution. The halving under scenario 1 simply halves both 
the mean delay (50% of 2008 value) and the total (primary) 
cost of delay. Although 94% of flights now have no ATFM 
delay, the standard deviation is still 72% of its original value. 
In scenario 2 (see Fig. 7) the columns are removed from the 
2008 actual values, in turn, working from right to left, 
redistributing each column of flights according to the original 
proportions to their left (including the zero-delay category), 
until the total cost has been (practically) halved (51% of 
original, see Table 8). Scenario 2 has a very similar standard 
deviation to scenario 1, although this time the mean has 
remained at 74% of its original (2008) value. From the airline 
perspective, a key advantage of scenario 2 is that although it 
has both a similar cost and standard deviation to scenario 1, 
there are no ATFM delays in the ‘≥60 minutes’ category 
(indeed, there are none greater than 39 minutes). Of these two 
theoretical scenarios, scenario 2 would thus be the one we 














Fig. 7. Scenario 2 – redistributed from right until cost halves. 
 
 From an ATFM perspective, however, the absence of all the 
highest slot delays would be impractical. Scenario 3 (Fig. 8) 
removes four fifths of the original, highest ATFM slot delays 
(i.e. in the ‘>=60 minutes’ category) and also all of the 20-59 
and 1-4 minutes delay categories, redistributing these 
(according to the original proportions) across the (three) 5-19 
categories. This reduces the overall cost to a third of the 
original value (see Table 8), also retaining the original number 














Fig. 8. Scenario 3 – rendered bimodal, with small tail. 
 
 Scenario 3 increases the number of flights with slot delays 
of less than 20 minutes by a factor of around 1.6, compared 
with the original distribution, and almost halves the original 




COMPARISON OF ATFM SCENARIOS WITH 2008 (ACTUAL) 
% relative to 2008 % delays (mins) Scenario 
Cost µ σ 0 <20 ≥60 
Actual 100 100 100 88 7.5 0.36 
1 50 50 72 94 3.7 0.18 
2 51 74 68 89 7.6 0.00 
3 33 60 53 88 12 0.07 
Values quoted to 2 s.f. 
 
The main purpose of this discussion is to explore the cost 
implications for different types of ATFM delay distributions, 
rather than the extent to which such distributions may be 
realised through new slot-allocation algorithms. Scenario 3 is 
likely to be somewhat more achievable than scenario 2 and 
illustrates the point that a shift towards a more bimodal 
distribution may achieve a significantly lower airline cost 
even with a higher mean (c.f. scenario 1) and with increased 
predictability. This latter improvement in predictability 
(reduction in standard deviation) may bring further financial 
benefits by prompting airlines to reduce their schedule buffers 
(with associated strategic cost savings – see Table 1A). In the 
specific case of scenario 3, this is reflected by the strong 
domination of delay slots in the 5-19 minutes range, although 
less pronounced shifts in such patterns may have significant 
scheduling effects for airlines, especially those statistically 
modelling their schedules based on empirical delay. 
The European target (adopted by the Provisional Council of 
EUROCONTROL in 2007) for en-route ATFM delay is one 
minute per flight, until 2010 (EUROCONTROL, 2009). This 
target refers to en-route ATFM delay in the summer period 
(May to October) and includes all causes (capacity, weather, 
etc.). In 2008, summer en-route ATFM delays increased for 
the fourth consecutive year, to 1.9 minutes per flight. This was 
the highest value since 2001, despite the notable slowdown in 
traffic growth. This specific target corresponds approximately 
to a halving of the current mean. The preceding discussion has 
explored, in outline, different ways in which delay reductions 
may be expressed, with two scenarios (2 and 3) where the cost 
halved (or better), but the mean did not. 
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It is clear, however, that there are constraints on setting 
separate targets for mean delays, associated standard 
deviations, and the resulting net cost. These three will 
obviously tend to move in the same direction at the same time. 
Although we have intentionally set out to explore scenarios in 
which this is not the case, the actual trend over the period 
2003-2008 has been for a linear relationship between µ and σ 
(r2=0.93; raw data, not shown, courtesy of Performance 
Review Unit, EUROCONTROL). This relationship is, of 
course, based on the same fundamental principles applying to 
slot allocation over this period, and need not pertain in the 
future. 
These illustrative analyses are subject to a number of 
approximations and limitations. The main issues are that: (a) 
the tail of the distribution is not analysed in detail – instead, 
all delays above 60 minutes are assigned a common value; (b) 
reactionary delays are not included; (c) the ATFM delays are 
treated as pure delays, without taking into account that they 
often occur as a compound delay along with other causes; (d) 
an average aircraft is used, rather than matching each delay 
with the actual aircraft affected. 
As for (a), the treatment of the tail remains a problem, 
unless every explicit delay has a delay cost quantified for it. 
The more, higher delay values, which are explicitly quantified, 
the better the approximation, but the results will remain 
approximations only. Notwithstanding the limitations of the 
approximations in this paper, the general principles revealed 
remain valid. Furthermore, at higher delay values, the issue of 
cancellation costs need to be considered. The limitations of (b) 
and (c) are related, and will be discussed in Section VIII. Of 
these factors, (a) – (d), (d) is anticipated to have the least 
quantitative impact on the results outlined here. 
The extent to which any future change in ATFM delay 
distributions is desirable, also depends on other factors. One 
such is airline preference. The preferred distributions for 
airlines could be deduced from stated preference studies 
similar in approach to that of Bates et al. (2001), presenting 
rail passengers with similar trade-offs between the means and 
standard deviations of delay, as a function of associated cost. 
These authors identify a particular pitfall which needs to be 
avoided, in that: “there is a suspicion that respondents are 
protesting about the unreliability of public transport services, 
and therefore manifesting excessive disutility from late 
arrival”. Such trade-off exercises with airlines should best be 
performed with realistic cost data for the airline, in order that 
meaningful choices may be made. These would ideally even 
be integrated with an appropriate statistical scheduling model. 
It is also clear that ANSP costs should be considered in the 
provision of any future, adapted approach to flow 
management. A solution which offers reduced costs to the 
airlines is of no net benefit if the cost of providing the 
solution, as passed on in en-route charges, for example, more 
than off-sets such savings. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 Although the major component of airline delay cost is 
typically that associated with delayed passengers, this is 
generally poorly quantified. A major opportunity, and 
challenge, facing the airline industry is the integration of 
disruption management techniques into flight planning. Costs 
such as those estimated in this paper could be used to inform 
improved decision-making in delay recovery, superior to 
‘rules of thumb’ currently employed by many airlines. A 
superior solution would be the calculation of such costs 
dynamically, through the enhancement of existing passenger 
reaccommodation tools to interface with airborne delay 
recovery – this could furnish airlines with large savings. 
 Best economic practice is unlikely to be consistent with 
arbitrarily set punctuality targets, such as “99% of flights 
within 5 minutes of schedule”. If used at all at this generic 
level, such targets need to be set within the context of cost-
benefit analyses. For example, what is the alternative bottom-
line impact of instead targeting 98% of flights within 10 
minutes of schedule? Again, use of ‘rules of thumb’ (such as 
recovering all the delay when it exceeds 15 minutes) can 
cause severely negative financial impacts. 
 Disruption management processes, including passenger 
reaccommodation, directly affect aircraft turnaround times. 
These are a key component of overall air traffic management 
(ATM) efficiency: “Air transport delays originate principally 
from local turn-around delays (76%), i.e. ground processes 
under local control outside the remit of ATM. This is an area 
for improvement and there should be consistency in the 
accuracy of ground and air-side processes in advanced 
concepts such as SESAR7” (EUROCONTROL, 2008). 
 There is also a particular need for further research into 
reactionary effects, especially the distribution of these 
between rotational (most of the reactionary delay) and non-
rotational components, and across individual, subsequent legs. 
This is necessary in order to better compute the large effect 
these have on total costs, since an assumed 60-minute 
reactionary delay is greatly more expensive than 6 delays of 
ten minutes. 
 The general superiority of passenger-centric metrics is of 
significance for delay measurement, although flight delays are 
still the only commonly-reported type of metric in both the US 
and Europe. The former also better capture the true impact of 
diverted and oversold flights. Better reactionary models, e.g. 
tracking tail-specific data throughout the operational day, 
would ideally examine passenger (and crew) dependencies 
between delay-impacted aircraft and improve the 
understanding of the relationships between passenger-centric 
metrics and reactionary effects. 
 Data from the EUROCONTROL Central Office for Delay 
Analysis (CODA) show that the reactionary to primary delay 
ratio has worsened year-on-year from 2003 to 2008, 
EUROCONTROL (2009). Despite a slowing down of 
European traffic growth in 2008 to 0.4% (compared with 5% 
in 2007; EUROCONTROL (2009)), the reactionary to 
7 The Single European Sky ATM Research programme, the 
European analogue of NextGen in the US. 
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primary delay ratio still increased a little: from 0.81 in 2007, 
to 0.83 in 2008. Tighter airline schedules and turnaround 
times, as well as higher levels of aircraft and airport 
utilisation, all contribute to an increased ratio. This can be in 
response to traffic growth and/or increased economic 
pressures on efficiency. With traffic ‘growth’ expected to be 
negative in 2009 (-3%), the ratio can be expected to fall, 
although there is probably a lag effect with operational 
practice. 
 Increased unpredictability (higher standard deviations) 
further compounds the problem of reactionary delay, unless 
airlines are able to appropriately adjust schedule buffers. This 
is clearly linked with the discussion of Section VII. ATFM-
related departure delays showed an increasing trend in 2008, 
and accounted for 27%8 of such delays, for en-route and 
airport constraints combined (EUROCONTROL, 2008). Cost 
estimations such as those of Section VII need to respect this 
wider context, taking at least some account of the 
dependencies between ATFM and non-ATFM delay. For 
example, if an aircraft misses its original slot due to a slow 
turnaround, and the subsequently re-filed flight plan has a 
high ATFM delay, it may be argued that no component of the 
final delay should be attributed to ATFM. On the other hand, 
ATFM delays may often be less easy to anticipate for the 
airline than certain other types of delay, and may occur closer 
to the planned departure time, such that the reactionary 
consequences may be relatively worse. These may be 
ambitious objectives to address quantitatively, but there is 
doubtless scope for further research. 
 This paper has explored a number of aspects of the 
distribution of delay costs across cost components, 
magnitudes of delay, phases of flight and reactionary modes. 
It has also examined the cost implications for different 
distributions of ATFM delay. An understanding of these 
distributions offers valuable insight into significant associated 
economic and environmental impacts. Neither delay 
management processes, nor flow management targets, should 
be restricted in scope to a consideration of delay minutes 
alone. 
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